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ABSTRACT
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides enhanced priority and security
features to debtor-in-possession (DIP) loans which can be obtained from a
lender with whom the borrower may have no past lending relationship. The
enhanced priority of DIP financing, and the choice of a DIP lender,
significantly impact the investment decisions made by the firm. We show DIP
loans from an existing lender leads to a higher level of investment. We also
show that a higher priority of DIP financing also leads to higher investment by
the firm. A bankruptcy judge should take these incentives into account when
approving the DIP loan.
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Philadelphia Newspapers LLC is accusing its pre-bankruptcy lenders
of engineering a financing pact that hijacks the publisher’s
restructuring process and places it in the hands of the lenders . . . the
publisher of the Philadelphia Inquirer warned that its control over
the [c]hapter 11 proceedings could be in jeopardy if its bankruptcy
loan of choice is not approved . . . . The terms of the prepetition
lenders’ DIP (debtor-in-possession) loan give those lenders a veto
power . . . . The company remains locked in a dispute with the
lenders over two bankruptcy loan proposals currently on the table.
Philadelphia Newspapers prefers the $15 million package offered by
Republic First Bank, but lenders say it strips them of necessary
protections. They argue that their $15 million financing package is
superior. Six hours of supervised mediation on Thursday was not
enough to bring the two parties to a consensus . . . . As a result, the
courtroom showdown over the bankruptcy loan has been postponed
until next Friday, when a judge will also examine the ‘‘exclusivity”
clause currently shielding the company from rival plans.1
—Dow Jones Institutional News, August 21, 2009
[Referring to auto industry bailout] . . . . The government functioned
as a debtor-in-possession, or DIP, lender. DIP lenders take equity
positions and negotiate a reorganization plan that makes sure that
every single creditor is made better off than they would have
been . . . .2
—Lawrence Summers, the director of the White
House’s National Economic Council, Interview
with Wall Street Journal, December 27, 2009

INTRODUCTION
When a firm can no longer meet its debt obligations should it be liquidated
or should it be restructured? In a world with no frictions or asymmetric
information the answer is straightforward: the choice that leads to preservation
of most value is the socially optimal choice.3 However, significant uncertainty
about the future prospects as well as conflict of interests between debt holders,
equity holders, and operating managers can make this a difficult decision.4 A
1
Rachel Feintzeig. DJ Philadelphia Newspapers Spars With Lenders Over Loan, Plan, DOW JONES
DAILY BANKRUPTCY REVIEW, Aug. 21, 2009.
2
Lawrence Summers, Lawrence Summers on the U.S. as Investor, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Dec.
27, 2009.
3
How to divide the value of a firm that is unable to service its financial obligations between its various
claim holders is an important, but separate question that we do not focus on in this paper. See generally Lucian
A. Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1988) (providing a
good review of optimal bankruptcy design).
4
See generally id.
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primary public policy goal of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act (commonly
referred to as the Bankruptcy Code or simply as the Code) is to identify
distressed firms, where the going-concern value is higher than the liquidation
value.5 The goal is then to protect those firms against efforts to force their
liquidation.6 The Code provides two key mechanisms to avoid immediate
liquidation of a firm that defaults on its debt. First is the ‘‘automatic stay”7
provision and the second is ‘‘exclusivity period.’’8 The automatic stay (§ 362
of the Code) ensures that a firm filing for reorganization under chapter 11 of
the Code is protected from any civil actions (e.g., seizing collateral, collection
of claims, creation of liens, etc.).9 The exclusivity period, provided under
§ 1121(b), ensures that the management team of the filing firm is the only
party allowed to propose the initial plan of reorganization (POR).10 The
combined effect of these two provisions is that the debtor (i.e., the incumbent
management) retains control of the assets and operations.11 Thus, after filing
for petition under chapter 11, the debtor is referred to as ‘‘debtor-inpossession” (DIP).12
However, simply stopping the creditors from enforcing their collection
claims is not enough to keep a firm operating as a going concern. A bankruptcy
filing is likely to trigger a liquidity crisis for the firm.13 For example, most
firms depend on credit from their suppliers to keep day-to-day operations
running.14 Typically, few suppliers are willing to ship goods on credit to a firm
operating under chapter 11, since their claim will not be secured, and will rank
lowest in priority (trade credit is typically unsecured and receives the lowest
priority under the Code).15 A chapter 11 filing would induce most suppliers to
demand cash upfront, which can paralyze the smooth operations of the firm
filing for chapter 11 protection.16 If the filing firm can line up a new source of
5

See H.R. Rep. No. 595, at 220 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6138–39.
See id. (“The purpose of a business reorganization, unlike a liquidation case, is to restructure a
business’s finances so that it may continue to provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a
return for its shareholders.”).
7
11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012).
8
Id. § 1121(b)
9
See id. § 362.
10
Id.
11
See David A. Skeel Jr., The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 25
CARDOZO L. REV. 1905, 1916–19 (2004).
12
11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (2012).
13
See Skeel Jr., supra note 11, at 1930.
14
See Travis N. Turner, Kmart and Beyond: A “Critical” Look at Critical Vendor Orders and the
Doctrine of Necessity, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 431, 438–39 (2006).
15
See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.03[3] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.).
16
See Turner, supra note 14, at 438; Matter of Jartran, Inc., 732 F.2d 584, 586 (7th Cir. 1984).
6
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financing (e.g., a new line of credit), it may be able to overcome such liquidity
problems.17 Potential lenders, however, are unlikely to provide new debt to a
borrower that has filed for bankruptcy.18 This reluctance arises from significant
uncertainty about the repayment ability of the borrower.19 Thus, there are few
funding options for a firm that is operating under the protection of chapter 11.
The Code addresses this problem by providing special creditor rights to loans
made after the chapter 11 filing.20 Specifically, § 364 of the Code allows for a
special kind of post-petition financing, usually referred to as DIP financing.21
The DIP lenders enjoy certain rights, which are unavailable to the creditors of
firms not operating under chapter 11 protection.22 Historically, the U.S.
bankruptcy law has always allowed some form of special financing for
distressed firms (especially railroads) attempting to reorganize their
operations.23 However, the 1978 Code went much farther in providing broader
rights to DIP financing.24 DIP financing has become an increasingly common
source of financing for U.S. firms filing for protection under chapter 11.25
Dahiya et al. report that the fraction of bankrupt firms, who obtain DIP
financing, has been rising.26 By the mid-1990s, almost half of the public firms
filing for chapter 11 obtained DIP financing.27 Ayotte and Morrison study
chapter 11 filings by public firms in 2001 and report that 50 percent of the
filers obtained DIP financing and an additional 26 percent obtained permission
to use cash under terms very similar to those of DIP loans.28 DIP financing is
also credited with making the reorganization process more creditor friendly as
DIP lenders have used this type of lending to exert control over the
17
See Stephen R. Dubè, Practical Management Initiatives in a Company’s Chapter 11 Preparation, 297 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 44, 44 (2010); 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 15.04[3] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J.
Sommer eds., 16th ed.).
18
Mark L. Prager, Financing the Chapter 11 Debtor: The Lenders’ Perspective, 45 BUS. LAW. 2127,
2127 (1990).
19
See Daniel V. Goodsell, Extending Post-Petition Credit to Reorganizing Debtors: Understanding the
Tricks and Traps of Bankruptcy Code Section 364, 1990 UTAH L. REV. 93, 93 (1990).
20
See George G. Triantis, A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 46 VAND. L.
REV. 901, 901 (1993).
21
Id.
22
See id.; Sandeep Dahiya et al., Debtor-in-Possession Financing and Bankruptcy Resolution:
Empirical Evidence, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 259, 260 (2003).
23
See Skeel, Jr., supra note 11, at 1908–13.
24
In the late nineteenth century, financially distressed railroads, attempting reorganization, would issue
a “receiver’s certificate,” which was a promissory note that would have the highest priority. See id. (providing
a detailed discussion of the historical development of DIP financing).
25
Dahiya, supra note 22, at 260.
26
Id.
27
Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11, 1 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 511, 515 (2009).
28
Id. at 523.
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reorganization process.29 For example, Bharath et al. and Adler et al. document
significant reduction in absolute priority deviations in favor of equity holders
in recent years.30 They argue that increased use of DIP financing is a key driver
for their findings.31 Ayotte and Skeel propose that many features of the
bankruptcy law, including provision for DIP financing, mitigate the liquidity
problem of the borrower as few (if any) lenders will be willing to provide debt
to a distressed borrower.32 The superior creditor control rights have made DIP
financing as contract of choice for large scale restructuring involving private
firms and government.33 For example, the U.S. Government chose to inject
over $300 million in General Motors via a DIP line of credit.34 Similarly, to
help with its restructuring, the city of Detroit used a $120 million DIP loan
from Barclays bank, the first deal of its kind for a municipal bankruptcy.35
Legal scholars, however, are not unanimous in endorsing DIP financing.36
It is possible that DIP financing can distort a firm’s investment choices.37
Bebchuk and Fried as well as Warren outline the drawbacks of senior and
secured financing.38 Since DIP financing is an extreme form of senior secured
lending, their argument against such loans is especially relevant.39 They argue
that such credit provides strong risk-shifting incentives, specifically for
shareholder aligned managers of a distressed firm.40 By pledging
unencumbered assets as security, a borrower can transfer wealth from preexisting unsecured creditors to the new secured creditors.41 Thus, DIP

29

Barry E. Adler et al., Value Destruction in the New Era of Chapter 11, 29 J. L. ECON. 461, 464

(2012).
30
Id.; Sreedhar T. Bharath, Venky Panchapagesan & Ingrid Werner, The Changing Nature of Chapter
11, 13 (Indian Institute of Management Bangalore, Working Paper No. 461, 2014).
31
Bharath, supra note 30, at 11–12; Adler, supra note 29, at 464.
32
Kenneth M. Ayotte & David A. Jr. Skeel, Bankruptcy Law as a Liquidity Provider, 80 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1557, 1604–06 (2013).
33
Skeel, supra note 11, at 1919–20.
34
Motors Liquidation Co. Avoidance Action Tr. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Motors
Liquidation Co.), 552 B.R. 253, 258 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016).
35
UPDATE 2-Detroit Gets $350 mln Financing Lifeline from Barclays, REUTERS (2013), http://www.
reuters.com/article/usa-detroit-financing/update-2-detroit-gets-350-mln-financing-lifeline-from-barclays-idUS
L1N0I11RM20131011.
36
Ayotte, supra note 27, at 514–15.
37
Id. at 515.
38
See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in
Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 873–74 (1996); Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy with Imperfect Information:
The Article 9 Full Priority Debates, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1373, 1379 (1996–1997).
39
Robin Phelan & Ocean Tama, The Use of DIP Financing as a Mechanism to Control the U.S.
Corporate Restructuring Process, INT’L BAR ASS’N LEGAL PRACTICE DIV., Oct. 2010, at 24.
40
See Bebchuk, supra note 38, at 873–74; Warren, supra note 38, at 1379.
41
Bebchuk, supra note 38, at 891–94.
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financing is likely to worsen the wealth-transfer incentives of the
management.42 Stultz and Johnson and Schwartz argue, however, that higher
priority financing can address the under-investment problem better.43 The
Code provides the bankruptcy judge with a wide latitude to approve an
appropriate level of priority that a DIP loan can hold.44 Thus, it is useful to
examine how the priority level of DIP loans affects the investment decision of
the borrower. This paper aims to provide a theoretical framework, which
allows a bankruptcy judge to evaluate the appropriate priority level of a DIP
loan.
Another related issue for the bankruptcy court arises when a borrower
requests a DIP loan from a lender who may or may not have any prior (prepetition) loan exposure to that borrower. The Code allows a distressed
borrower to get its DIP financing from either its existing (pre-petition) lender,
or from a new lender.45 There are significant benefits for a pre-petition lender
to continue as the DIP lender. For example, an existing lender already has a
relationship with the borrower which provides the lender an information and
cost advantage over a new lender.46 Furthermore, by not providing DIP
financing, the existing lender risks diluting its security on the pre-petition
loans.47 Finally, the Code allows (although rarely) for a pre-petitioned
unsecured lender to provide DIP financing, and the use of collateral, to secure
both the unsecured pre-petition loan as well as the post-petition loan.48 This
rare type of DIP financing is allowed under the cross-collateralization clause of
the Code.49
These arguments imply that the pre-petition lead lender is the ‘‘Natural
DIP Lender.’’50 There are, however, competing reasons that favor a new lender
as the sole provider of DIP financing. First, there is considerable disagreement
among the various claimholders regarding the value of the firm, and how it

42

Cf. id. at 870–71; Warren, supra note 38, at 1374–76.
See Rene M. Stulz & Herb Johnson, An Analysis of Secured Debt, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 501, 512–19
(1985); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 DUKE L.J.
425, 466–69 (1997).
44
See 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2012).
45
Id. § 364(d).
46
See Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuram G. Rajan, The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence
from Small Business Data, 49 J. FIN. 3, 5–6 (1994).
47
See PAUL ZUMBRO, DIP AND EXIT FINANCING TRENDS AND STRATEGIES IN A CHANGING MARKET 6
(2016).
48
11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012).
49
Id.
50
See Petersen, supra note 46, at 5–6; ZUMBRO, supra note 47, at 6–7.
43
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should be divided among the various classes.51 The pre-petition lender
(hereafter, the inside bank) enjoys substantial inside information compared to
the trade creditor or public debtholders.52 The inside bank and the firm have
strong incentives to collude and extract higher concessions from the
uninformed claimholders.53 LoPucki and Whitford describe occurrences of this
form of collusion, prior to the adoption of the absolute priority rule in 1939.54
Bulow and Shoven and Gertner and Scharfstein discuss the coalition formation
by the shareholders and the inside bank to achieve similar wealth transfers.55
Berlin, John, and Saunders provide a theoretical setting, which describes a
rational junior claimholder who anticipates the possible collusion of the inside
bank and the firm.56 Therefore, such a creditor will be unwilling to accept the
plan of reorganization proposed by this coalition.57 By allowing a new lender
to provide DIP financing, a firm adds credibility to its reorganization plan.58
Also, the under-investment problem, caused by the debt overhang, may be
mitigated if the new lender provides DIP financing.59
Second, Sharpe and Rajan provide another reason for turning to a new
lender for post-petition financing.60 Both studies show theoretical models of
the bank-borrower relationship.61 These models show that the inside bank can

51
See David T. Brown, Claimholder Incentive Conflicts in Reorganization: The Role of Bankruptcy
Law, 2 REV. FIN. STUD. 109, 109–10 (1989); Ronald M. Giammarino, The Resolution of Financial Distress, 2
REV. FINANCIAL STUDIES 25, 27 (1989). Even among the same class (e.g., secured creditors), having multiple
creditors can make renegotiation challenging. Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, Erik Berglof & Gerard Roland,
Claimholder Incentive Conflicts in Reorganization: The Role of Bankruptcy Law, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 2648,
2649–51 (2010).
52
SANDEEP DAHIYA, KOSE JOHN, MANJU PURI & GABRIEL RAMIREZ, THE DYNAMICS OF DEBTOR-INPOSSESSION FINANCING: BANKRUPTCY RESOLUTION AND THE ROLE OF PRIOR LENDERS 5 (2000).
53
See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity’s Share in the Bankruptcy
Reogranization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 132 (1990).
54
Id.
55
See Robert Gertner & David Scharfstein, A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization
Law, 46 J. FIN. 1189, 1189–1222 (1991).
56
Mitchell Berlin, Kose John & Anthony Saunders, Bank Equity Stakes in Borrowing Firms and
Financial Distress, 9 REV. FIN. STUD. 889, 892 (1996).
57
A number of recent news stories highlight these conflicts. For example, in the 2013 bankruptcy filing
of GMX resources, both the unsecured creditors as well as a group of preferred shareholders filed objections to
its $50 million DIP loan. See, e.g., Matt Chiappardi, GMX Investors Blast $50M Ch. 11 Loan as Unfair, LAW
360 (Apr. 26, 2013), https://www.law360.com/articles/436469/gmx-investors-blast-50m-ch-11-loan-as-unfair.
58
Darla D. Moore, How to Finance a Debtor in Possession, 6 COM. LENDING REV. 3, 8 (1990).
59
Stuart Gilson, Coming Through in a Crisis: How Chapter 11 and the Debt Restructuring Industry Are
Helping to Revive the U.S. Economy, 24 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 23, 28 (2012).
60
Stephen A. Sharpe, Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model
of Customer Relationships, 45 J. FIN. 1069–1087 (1990); Raghuram G. Rajan, Insiders and Outsiders: The
Choice between Informed and Arm’s-Length Debt, 47 J. FIN. 1367–1400 (1992).
61
Sharpe, supra note 60, at 1071; Rajan, supra note 60, at 1370–72.
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extract monopoly rents from its borrowers, due to its information advantage.62
This monopoly power likely plays a significant role in the period leading up to
the chapter 11 filing, as the distressed debtor tries to renegotiate his debt.63 The
increasing rent extraction by the inside bank can make the securing of DIP
financing from a new lender more attractive.64 The assumption of a
competitive market for the supply of loans implies there are many new lenders
willing to extend DIP loans.65 In some instances, lenders use DIP financing as
an opportunity to replace old banking relationships.66 These arguments imply
that there are strong incentives for a firm to approach a new lender to provide
post-petition credit.67
Our discussion thus far, underscores the importance of priority level of DIP
loans, and the choice of DIP lenders in shaping the investment decisions of
borrowers. In this paper we provide a theoretical model that examines these
issues. The two papers most closely related to our papers are Gertner and
Scharfstein, and Triantis.68 Gertner and Scharfstein primarily focus on how
priority and maturity structure of existing debt affects the restructuring
outcomes.69 Our paper focuses more narrowly on the issues that arise due to
special protection offered to DIP loans by § 364 of the Code. Triantis develops
a theoretical model for judicial oversight of DIP financing.70 Our paper
presents a more formal treatment of his model and provides extensions to the
cases where a DIP loan enjoys ‘‘cross-collateralization” as well as analyzing
the case of DIP financing being provided by an existing junior creditor. The
financing by a junior creditor typically happens when a large trade creditor
agrees to provide funding for restructuring. For example, Pinnacle Air, a small
regional airline, obtained a $75 million DIP loan from Delta Airlines which
was its largest trade creditor and customer at the time of chapter 11 filing.71

62

Sharpe, supra note 60, at 1069.
Rajan, supra note 60, at 1368.
64
Sharpe, supra note 60, at 1069.
65
ZUMBRO, supra note 47, at 15–16.
66
See, e.g., David Neustadt, Lending to Bankrupt Companies Seen as Opportunity to Gain Some Assets,
AM. BANKER, Oct. 27, 1987. Chemical Bank, the industry pioneer in 1990’s, used DIP financing to generate
new lending and investment banking businesses from the firms that it previously had no relationship with. One
of its managing directors stated, “we approach the market as a new business opportunity and typically have no
existing exposure to the debtor.” Moore, supra note 58, at 8.
67
Neustadt, supra note 66; Moore, supra note 66, at 8.
68
Gertner, supra note 55, at 1189; Triantis, supra note 20, at 901.
69
Gertner, supra note 55, at 1189, 1192.
70
Triantis, supra note 20, at 918–19.
71
Pinnacle Airlines Corp., 483 B.R. 381, 389, 396 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).
63
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The plan of the paper is as follows: in Section 2 we briefly describe the
chapter 11 process, and discuss the various financing options available to the
firm operating under chapter 11. This section also provides the details of §
364 of the Code, which governs the DIP lending process. In Section 3, the
basic model is laid out and solved for alternative bankruptcy regimes. We
conclude in Section 4.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. The Chapter 11 Reorganization Process
One of the major differences between state and federal non-bankruptcy
debt collection laws, and the Code, is the idea of a fresh start for the debtors.72
For a corporate borrower, this is usually achieved via a chapter 11 filing.73 As
described by Epstein, Nickles, and White, there are various stages to a chapter
11 case.74 A voluntary filing by the debtor marks the first stage of the
reorganization process.75 The filing immediately results in an automatic stay on
all payments to pre-petition creditors, all collection efforts, and all foreclosure
actions.76 Thus, the automatic stay provides a major incentive for a distressed
borrower to seek protection under chapter 11.77
Simultaneously, this borrower reduces the power of pre-petition creditors,
while allowing the incumbent management to maintain operating control of the
debtor’s assets.78 The result is that the debtor is in possession of his own affairs
or a ‘‘debtor-in-possession.’’79 But the protection from creditors comes at a
cost. The debtor-in-possession (i.e., incumbent management) faces several
restraints on how the debtor-in-possession can use the estate’s assets, and, in

72

In re Neiheisel, 32 B.R. 146, 147 (Bankr. D. Utah 1983).
The use of chapter 11 is not restricted to a business entity only; some of the lower courts barred
individual chapter 11 filings until the Supreme Court ruled that individual debtors may file for relief under
chapter 11. Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 166 (1991).
74
DAVID G. EPSTEIN, STEVE H. NICKLES, AND JAMES J. WHITE, BANKRUPTCY, HORNBOOK SERIES
STUDENT EDITION, 1993.
75
In few cases, the commencement of chapter 11 is initiated by an involuntary petition by the creditors
under §303. 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303 (2012).
76
Id. § 362.
77
Erin Y. Baker, The Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy: An Analysis of the Braniff Chapter 11 Proceeding,
14 TEX. TECH L. REV. 433, 433 (1983).
78
While the Code allows the bankruptcy judge to replace the existing management by a court appointed
trustee to operate the firm, in practice, the appointment of a trustee is very rare, and incumbent management
usually continues in place, at least in the period immediately after the filing. Id.
79
Id. at 452–53.
73
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particular, the liquid assets, such as cash.80 The various guidelines and
restrictions on the use, sale, and lease of assets are contained in § 363 of the
Code.81
The debtor-in-possession plays two critical roles. First, the debtor-inpossession formulates a plan of reorganization and, second, runs the day-today business of the firm.82 Once the firm has filed for bankruptcy, the
incumbent management continues to operate its business while formulating a
plan of reorganization.83 At this stage the firm requires some form of
financing, including DIP financing.84 Next, we discuss the various financing
options available to a firm operating under chapter 11.
B. The Post-petition Financing Process
Let us now turn to the institutional details of the post-petition financing
process. Table 1 shows the menu of financing choices available to a firm after
filing for chapter 11. The first and natural source of funds for a business is the
cash flow generated by its operations.85 This can be a substantial resource, as
the firm is no longer paying interest on its pre-petition debt.86 Although § 363
of the Code allows the firms to engage in the ordinary course of business
without prior approval of the bankruptcy court, the use of cash is subject to
extensive restraints.87 Section 363(c)(2) specifically prohibits even the ordinary
use of ‘‘cash collateral’’ without permission from the court.88 Thus, obtaining
court approval for the use of cash collateral provides the firm with its first
source of liquidity.89

80

11 U.S.C. § 363 (2012).
Id.
82
This exclusivity period is for 120 days from the date of a chapter 11 filing but is usually extended.
Thomas G. Kelch, The Phantom Fiduciary: The Debtor in Possession in Chapter 11, 38 WAYNE L. REV. 1323,
1323, 1327, 1330 (1992).
83
Id.
84
Moore, supra note 58, at 4–5.
85
Kristin C. Wigness, Back to Basics: Obtaining Court Approval of DIP Financing, LAW 360 (July 17,
2013), https://www.law360.com/articles/456314/back-to-basics-obtaining-court-approval-of-dip-financing.
86
Id.
87
11 U.S.C. § 363 (2012).
88
Section 363(a) defines cash collateral to mean cash, negotiable instruments, documents of title,
securities, deposit accounts, and other cash equivalents. Id. § 363(a).
89
Sources of Liquidity and Factors Affecting Firm’s Liquidity, FINANCE TRAIN, http://financetrain.com/
sources-of-liquidity-and-factors-affecting-firms-liquidity/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2017).
81
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The use of cash collateral may not adequately meet all the firm’s financing
needs.90 Therefore, the firm may need to raise funds through DIP financing.91
In most cases, the firm tries to arrange DIP credit before the formal filing of
the chapter 11 petition.92 If the firm is able to arrange DIP financing, then the
petition is accompanied by a request of approval for DIP financing.93 DIP
financing can be obtained under § 364 of the Code, which has four
subsections.94 As Table 1 describes, ‘‘§ 364 was structured with an escalating
series of inducements that a debtor-in-possession may offer to attract credit in
the post-petition period.’’95 Subsections (a) through (d) provide an increasing
level of priority and security for the DIP lender.96 Section 364 is progressive in
nature, since the benefits provided in each subsection are not available until it
has been established that a good faith effort to obtain credit was unsuccessful.97
DIP financing under § 364(a) is the easiest to arrange, as it does not require
any court approval.98 It allows the debtor to obtain unsecured credit in the
ordinary course of business.99 This credit must fund an expense that is
otherwise eligible for treatment as an administrative expense under § 503(b),
and enjoys the administrative expense priority.100 The restriction of credit
under § 364(a) to the ordinary course of business means that this financing is
usually limited to trade credit.101
DIP financing under § 364(b) can be used for purposes other than the
ordinary course of business, but its use must be approved by the bankruptcy
court after a due notice and hearing.102 The lenders prefer this form of
financing because it removes the ambiguity surrounding whether or not the

90
Chapter 11-Bankruptcy Basics, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/
bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-11-bankruptcy-basics (last visited Sept. 9, 2017).
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Wigness, supra note 85.
94
11 U.S.C. § 364 (2012).
95
In re Photo Promotion Assocs., Inc., 87 B.R. 835, 839 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988).
96
Id.
97
11 U.S.C. § 364 (2012).
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Within the class of general unsecured loans, §507(a) assigns different priorities to different types of
unsecured claims. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (2012). Administrative expenses, as defined in §503(b), are entitled to
first priority, among unsecured claims. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (2012). The examples of administrative claims
include professional fees, costs of selling or liquidating assets, etc.
101
11 U.S.C. § 364 (2012).
102
Id.
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credit is made in the ordinary course of business.103 As with the credit under
§ 364(a), the loans under § 364(b) are unsecured.104
Section 364(c) provides stronger incentives to the lenders. Under three
clauses, it empowers the debtor to grant a DIP lender:
1. priority over all other administrative expenses in the case,
2. security interest in unencumbered assets, or
3. a junior lien on already encumbered assets.105
Section 364(c), like § 364(b), requires court approval after the due notice
and hearing.106 Furthermore, the debtor must prove to the court that it could not
obtain financing on an unsecured basis under § 364(a) and § 364(b).107
The court can approve financing under § 364(d) if the priorities and
security offered by § 364(c) are insufficient to obtain new credit.108 This allows
the debtor to offer a lien on the already pledged collateral that is senior to
existing liens, referred to as priming liens.109 The approval of such a priming
lien is subject to several requirements. First, as in § 364(c), the debtor-inpossession must prove that it was unable to obtain financing under § 364(a), §
364(b), or § 364(c).110 Second, the debtor-in-possession must prove that the
interests of the lender being primed are adequately protected.111 Finally,
§ 364(e) protects the DIP lenders from the adverse effects of a subsequent
reversal, or modification, on appeal of the bankruptcy court’s orders
authorizing the super-priority and priming lien.112
There is case law in which the pre-petition, unsecured lender agrees to
provide DIP loans, provided that the collateral for the post-petition loan can
also be pledged as security for the pre-petition, unsecured loans.113 This
arrangement is called ‘‘cross-collateralization,’’ and provides additional
incentives for a pre-petition lender to extend post-petition financing.114
103
Cf. David Epstein, Postpetition Lending Under Section 364: Issues Regarding the Gap Period and
Financing for Prepackaged Plans, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 103 (1992).
104
11 U.S.C. § 364(b) (2012).
105
Id. § 364(c).
106
Id.
107
Id. § 364(d)(1).
108
Id. § 364(d)(1)(A).
109
See Epstein, supra note 103.
110
11 U.S.C. § 364(d)(1)(A) (2012).
111
Id. § 364(d)(1)(B).
112
Id. § 364(e); Epstein, supra note 103.
113
See In re Vanguard Diversified. Inc., 31 Bankr. 364, 366 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983).
114
Id.
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Whether or not it is permitted under the Code remains a controversial and
unsettled issue.115
Table 2 provides the priority structure of claims for a hypothetical firm that
has contracted post-petition financing under all the subsections of § 364.
II. THE MODEL
The focus of this paper is to examine how DIP financing affects the
investment incentives of a borrower. For a financially distressed firm, the legal
recourse to the same, or higher priority, DIP financing is unique to the Code.116
We examine how a financially distressed firm would invest if the only source
of DIP financing is from one of its existing borrowers. Here, we focus on how
changing the priority of the DIP loan, compared to existing pre-petition loans,
would influence the investment decisions of the borrower. Next, we introduce
the possibility of obtaining DIP financing from a new lender, and examine its
impact on the investment policy of the borrower.
Our model is similar to the one used by Gertner and Scharfstein.117 The
model has two dates. At time 0, the only asset that the firm possesses is cash
L and an opportunity to invest in a project requiring total outlay of I . The
firm has debt of face value B , due at date 0 that is held by a syndicate of
lenders. The the firm is insolvent at date 0, i.e., B > L . The investment
opportunity can only be exploited by the firm and cannot be sold separately.
Thus, the firm needs I − L to finance the investment opportunity, and it has the
choice of arranging DIP financing from either its old lenders, or from a new
lender. If no DIP loan can be arranged, the firm will be liquidated for L . The
project requiring an investment of I , generates a stochastic cash flow X ,
which is distributed over [0, ∞) , with a probability distribution f (X ) . All
parties are assumed to be risk neutral, and the risk-free rate is assumed to be
zero.118 Thus, in case the firm has a terminal cash flow ( X ), larger than the

115
See, e.g., In re Saybrook Mfg. Co., 963 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1992); In re Monarch Circuit Indus.,
Inc., 41 B.R. 859 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) (prohibiting cross-collateralization).
116
For example, the U.K. insolvency law requires that an Administrator, typically a qualified insolvency
practitioner, replaces the board of directors as the manager of the company in administration (i.e.,
reorganization). However, in recent years some countries are amending their bankruptcy statutes to allow some
form of senior secured lending for the reorganizing firm. For example, in 2009 Canada amended its
Companies Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) to codify the circumstances in which courts will allow DIP
loans. See Epstein, supra note 103.
117
See Gertner, supra note 55.
118
While assumption of zero risk free rate is not realistic, it allows us to abstract away from determining
the interest rate and, instead, allows us to focus on the effect that priority has on the investment incentives of
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face value of the total debt ( B ), the residual surplus is retained by the coalition
of DIP lender and the shareholders of the firm. This surplus can be shared
between the borrower and lender, although we do not model the sharing
contract. To keep model tractable, we make the same assumption as Gertner
and Scharfstein and assign the entire surplus to the DIP lender.119
We define the first best investment policy (socially optimal) for the firm as
one that increases the total value of the firm. Let NPV * (Socially Optimal)
denote the minimum level of expected NPV of a project, such that the project
would increase the value of the firm. It is easy to see that (NPV) *SociallyOp timal =0,
i.e., all positive NPV projects should be undertaken. Thus, every project
requiring an investment I that has an expected return, X greater than I ,
should be undertaken. In the next section, we examine how the presence of
pre-existing risky debt, and the priority of DIP loans, affects the investment
policy.
A. DIP Financing Provided by Pre-petition (Old) Lender
We shall first restrict our analysis where one of the firm’s existing lenders,
which we refer to as ‘‘Old or Pre-petition Lender,’’ provides DIP loans.
Additionally, we focus on the impact of different priority levels of DIP loans
on the investment incentives of the borrower.

1. The Pre-petition Bank Provides Financing at the Same Priority as Prepetition Loans
Assume that the bank provides the DIP loan and has a fraction ϕ of the
pre-petition loan. Thus, the face value of its existing debt is ϕB . If the firm
does not get DIP financing, it will be liquidated. In that case, the potential DIP
lender with fraction ϕ of the old loan would realize a cash flow equal to ϕL .
Thus, the pre-petition bank will provide a DIP loan only if:
Z

ϕB + I − L

0

Z



∞

Xf ( X ) dX +  [ X − (1 − ϕ ) B ] f ( X ) dX − ( I − L ) > ϕ L .

(1)

Z

Where Z = B + ( I − L) denotes the total face value of debt (DIP loan and
pre-petition ) at time 1. Equation 1 is the incentive compatibility constraint for
the old lender willing to provide a DIP loan. The first term is the pay-off to the
the firm. Gertner and Scharfstein also make this assumption in analyzing the effect of the reorganization law
on workouts. See id.
119
See id.
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DIP lender when the firm’s cash flow is not sufficient to cover the entire debt
repayments. The second term is the pay-off to DIP lender when the cash flow
is adequate to pay off the debt, and the DIP lender takes the residual value.120
The
first
term
in
Equation
1
can
be
rewritten
as
Z B + I − L
Z (1 − ϕ ) B
Xf ( X ) dX − 
Xf ( X ) dX . Also the second term can be

0

Z

expanded

0

and

Z

rewritten

as

∞

∞

Z

Z

 Xf ( X ) dX −  (1 − ϕ ) Bf ( X ) dX .

Finally,

∞

X =  Xf ( X )dX . Thus, equation 1 can be rearranged as:
0
Z

X −I > 
0

∞
(1 − ϕ ) B
Xf ( X ) dX +  (1 − ϕ ) Bf ( X ) dX − L + ϕ L.
Z
Z

(2)

Let us define VBE as:
Z

V BE = 
0

∞
B
Xf ( X ) dX +  Bf ( X ) dX .
Z
Z

(3)

Conceptually VBE is the value of existing debt conditional on the firm
obtaining a DIP loan regardless of who provides the financing. Substituting the
value of VBE in Equation 2, it can be rewritten as:
X − I > (1 − ϕ )[VBE − L] = ( NPV ) *EqualPriority .

(4)

The expected NPV of undertaking the investment is X − I . Thus, the right
hand side of the inequality in Equation 4 is the minimum expected NPV of the
project, for which an old lender would provide DIP financing at a priority level
equal to that of pre-petition loans. If [VBE − L] is equal to zero, then we obtain
the socially optimal outcome: all projects with positive NPV are financed. This
is the case if the decision to obtain DIP financing makes the value of existing
debt exactly equal to the pay-off if the firm is liquidated. This implies that
there is no wealth transfer to or from existing debt holders arising from the
decision to invest in the project financed by new DIP loan. This socially
optimal outcome can also occur if the pre-petition lender is the only existing
lender, i.e., ϕ = 1 . In this case, the investment problem is trivial, since old
lenders would always finance only positive NPV projects. If [VBE − L] is not
equal to zero, however, then the firm’s investment policy will deviate from the
120
For simplicity, we assume that entire surplus is paid to the DIP lender. This assumption can be
relaxed to allow sharing of the surplus between the DIP lender and shareholders, but would add complexity
without any additional insights on how priority of DIP loan affects the investment choice.
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socially optimal. If [VBE − L] < 0, the right hand side of Equation 4 will be
negative. Thus, the firm will invest in some projects that are negative NPV
implying over-investment. On the other hand, if [VBE − L] > 0, the minimum
cut-off point above which the firm will invest is strictly greater than zero. This
implies that the firm will forego some positive NPV projects resulting in
under-investment.

2. The Pre-petition Bank Provides DIP Financing at a Priority Higher to
Pre-petition Loans
If the DIP lender is able to get higher priority, then the incentive
compatibility constraint can be rewritten as:
I −L

Z

0

I −L

 Xf ( X )dX +  [( I − L ) + ϕ ( X − ( I − L ))] f ( X ) dX ;
∞

+  [ X − (1 − ϕ ) B ] f ( X ) dX − ( I − L ) > ϕ L.

(5)

Z

The first term in Equation 5 is the pay-off to the DIP lender if cash flow is
less than the face value of the DIP loan ( I − L ). The second and third terms
describe the pay-offs to DIP lenders at increasing levels of realized cash flows.
The
second
term
can
be
expanded
and
rewritten
as
Z
Z
Z
.
Rearranging
the
 (1 − ϕ )( I − L ) f ( X ) dX +  Xf ( X ) dX −  (1 − ϕ ) Xf ( X ) dX
I −L

I −L

I −L

terms gives:
∞

Z

Z

Z

I −L

I −L

X − I > (1−ϕ)Bf ( X )dX +  (1− ϕ) Xf ( X )dX −  (1− ϕ)(I − L) f ( X )dX − (1− ϕ)L.

(6)

Let us define VBH as:
Z

∞

I −L

Z

V BH =  [ X − ( I − L )] f ( X ) dX +  Bf ( X ) dX .

(7)

Conceptually, VBH is the value of an existing loan conditional on a firm
obtaining a new DIP loan (regardless of who provides this loan) at a higher
priority compared to existing loan. Substituting VBH in Equation 6 yields:
X − I > (1 − ϕ )[VBH − L] = ( NPV )*HigherPriority .

(8)

Denoting (1 − ϕ )[VBH − L] by (NPV) *HigherPrio rity , Equation 8 describes the
minimum level of expected NPV from a project for which the pre-petition
lender would provide DIP loans. The higher priority of DIP loan would
induce the lender to finance a larger set of projects, since the minimum
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acceptable NPV is lower for a lender, who gets higher priority for his DIP
loan as summarized in the following lemma:
Lemma 1 (L:L1) ( NPV )*EqualPrior ity is strictly greater than ( NPV )*HigherPrio rity .
This implies that the cut-off level for NPV below which the project will not
be financed is lower if the DIP loan is at at a higher priority compared to
the existing loans. Thus, a higher priority of a DIP loan results in a higher
level of investment.
Intuitively, the increased willingness to invest, due to a higher priority of a
DIP loan, addresses the well-known problem of ‘‘debt overhang’’ as discussed
in Myers.121 Thus, for firms that have an attractive set of investment projects,
but face a large debt overhang, access to a higher priority DIP loan would lead
to more efficient investment. However, the higher priority may not be an
optimal outcome for all borrowers. For borrowers with poor investment
opportunities, higher investment may lead to inefficient risk-shifting in
negative NPV projects.122 For such borrowers, DIP financing should be
provided (if at all) at equal priority.123 We summarize this intuition in the
following proposition:
Proposition 1 (P:OldPriority)

DIP financing at higher priority should only be granted for the
borrowers that have good investment opportunities.124
3. Cross-collateralization
Cross-collateralization is a controversial feature of the Code, under
which the bankruptcy judge can allow the old lender, providing DIP
financing, to have higher priority for both the DIP financing and its
proportion of the old loan.125 In some cases, the pre-petition lender can
‘‘roll-up’’ its old loans into the new DIP loan, effectively using part of the

121

Stewart Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147, 147–75 (1977).
Michael C. Jensen, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Cross-collateralization has been defined by the Second Circuit as follows: “In return for making new
loans to a debtor-in-possession under [chapter 11], a financing institution obtains a security interest on all
assets of the debtor, both those existing at the date of the order, and those created in the course of the [chapter
11] proceeding.” This is not only for the new loans (the propriety of which is not contested), but also for
existing indebtedness to it. Otte v. Mfrs. Hanover Com. Corp., 596 F.2d 1092, 1094 (2d Cir. 1979).
122
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DIP loan to retire the old loan.126 Conceptually, a roll-up facility is similar
to a cross-collateralized DIP loan.127 We examine the investment incentives
if the DIP loan is cross-collateralized as highest priority.
The face value of total loans extended by a pre-petition DIP lender would
equal ϕB + I − L , which can be rewritten as Z − (1 − ϕ ) B = T . In order for the
DIP lender to be willing to provide financing that is cross-collateralized, the
equation must hold:
T

Z

∞

0

T

Z

 Xf ( X )dX +  (I + ϕB − L) f ( X )dX + [ X − (1− ϕ )B] f ( X )dX − (I − L) > ϕL. (9)

The first term of Equation 9 reflects the cross-collaterlization, since both
the pre-petition loan exposure of the DIP lender as well as the new DIP loans
enjoy first priority. Note that the fraction of pre-petition loan owned by
lender(s) not providing the DIP loan is effectively subordinated. Rearranging
the terms we get:
∞

Z

Z

T

X − I >  (1 − ϕ ) Bf ( X ) dX + [ X − ( I + ϕ B − L )] f ( X ) dX − (1 − ϕ ) L ,

which can be rewritten as:
Z [ X − ( I + ϕ B − L )]

∞
X − I > (1 − ϕ )  Bf ( X ) dX + 
f ( X ) dX − L .
Z
T
ϕ
(1
)
−



(10)

C
Let us define VB as:
∞

Z

Z

T

VBC =  Bf ( X ) dX + 

[ X − ( I + ϕB − L )]
f ( X ) dX .
(1 − ϕ )

(11)

Substituting VBC in Equation 10 we get:

X − I > (1 − ϕ )[VBC − L].

(12)

Thus (1 − ϕ )[V − L] is the minimum level of expected NPV for a project
that would be financed by a cross-collateralized DIP loan. We denote this by
NPV * (cross-collateral). Effectively, cross-collaterlization is an even higher
level of priority, compared to the case where only the DIP loan had higher
priority. This can be summarized in the following proposition:
C
B

126
127

In re Capmark Fin. Group Inc., 438 B.R. 471, (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 1, 2010).
In re Coda Holdings, Inc., (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 6, 2017).
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Proposition 2 (P:Cross)

For borrowers that have an attractive investment opportunity set, DIP
financing can be cross-collateralized with the pre-petition debt. Conversely, for
borrowers with a poor investment opportunity, set DIP financing should not be
cross-collateralized.
Again, the result is expected due to an increase on the priority of the loan,
which makes the lender willing to finance a larger set of projects.
So far, we have examined how the priority of a DIP loan affects the
investment decisions of the firm. However, we restricted the firm’s choice
of DIP lender to one of its existing pre-petition lenders. In the next section,
we examine what happens when the firm raises DIP loans from a new
lender. This new loan, the so called ‘‘pure debtor-in-possession financing,’’
happens when a lender with no pre-petition relationship to the firm agrees
to provide DIP financing.128
4. New DIP Lender is Allowed
In this section, we show that for same level of priority, the minimum level
of expected NPV, required to induce a new DIP lender to lend, is always
higher than the minimum NPV required by a DIP lender, who also holds some
pre-petition debt. This situation is captured in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 (P:NewLender1)

For the same level of priority, the minimum acceptable NPV for a project
required by a new DIP lender is higher than the one required by the loan
provided by a pre-petition lender.
The intuition here is that new DIP lender must break even on the DIP loan
only as it has no outstanding debt. An existing borrower will be willing to
finance a project with somewhat lower NPV as long it leads to some increase
in value of existing loan. Thus, the existing lender may be willing to invest,
even if the DIP loan does not break even on a stand-alone basis, as long as the
old loan recovery level is high enough.

128

See In re Gen. Growth Prop., Inc., 412 B.R. 122, 126 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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5. Same Priority DIP Financing from an Existing Lender vs. Higher
Priority DIP Financing from a New Lender
Another interesting issue is when a bankruptcy judge is presented with
competing offers from an existing lender, who is willing to provide DIP loans
at equal priority, and a new lender, who is willing to provide DIP financing at a
higher priority. While at first glance it may appear unfair to grant the new
lender higher priority, the investment decision would in fact depend on how
large a fraction of the pre-petition loan (i.e., ϕ ) is owned by the existing
lender, who willingly provides DIP financing. This situation is formalized in
the following proposition:
Proposition 4 (P:NewLender2)

DIP financing, from an existing lender at the same priority, would still
lead to more investment than DIP financing at a higher priority from a new
lender, only if the pre-petition lender holds a fraction ϕ > ϕ min , where:
V E −V H
ϕ min = B E B .
VB − L
This proposition captures the idea that if the old lender holds a large
enough fraction of existing debt, the ability to increase the value of this
outstanding debt is strong enough to induce the lender to provide DIP
financing at the same priority and achieve similar investment incentives, which
a new DIP lender will achieve only if granted higher priority.
B.

DIP Financing from the Pre-petition Senior Lender vs. the Pre-petition
Junior Lender

So far, we have considered a firm with only one class of pre-petition
debt. In this section we examine what happens if the firm has two different
classes of pre-petition debt and the DIP financing can be provided by either
of them. While the basic framework of our model remains the same, the
firm now has senior debt of face value B and junior debt of face value J .
We assume that that there are only two pre-petition lenders with one
holding the senior debt and the other holding the junior debt. We also
assume that the liquidation value L of the firm is lower than B , so that
both classes of creditors would lose part of the face value in case the firm is
liquidated. The DIP financing is assumed to be at the same level as the
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senior debt.129 If the senior creditor provides the DIP financing, the
following condition must be satisfied:
1
2
0 Xf ( x) + Z1 ( I − L + B) f ( x)dx + Z2 ( X − J ) f ( x)dx − ( I − L) > L 
Z

∞

Z

∞

X − I > Z12[ X − ( I − L + B)] f ( x)dx + Z2 Jf ( x)dx = k1 ,
Z

(13)

where Z1 = I − L + B and Z 2 = I − L + B + J .
The junior creditor would be willing to provide DIP financing if:
I −L
∞
Xf ( x) + Z1( X − B) f ( x)dx − ( I − L) > 0 
Z1
∞
Z B
X − I > 0 1 Xf ( x)dx + Z1 ( B) f ( x)dx − L = k 2 . (14)
Z1
Z1

0

The right-hand side of Equation 13 gives the lowest NPV project that the
firm with DIP financing from it senior creditors would be able to finance.
Similarly the right-hand side of Equation 14 gives the lowest NPV project for
the firm with DIP financing from its junior creditor.
To examine the investment policy of the firm with DIP financing from
different class of pre-petition lenders we compare k1 and k 2 . If k 2 − k1 < 0 , the
financing from junior creditor will lead to greater investment as the minimum
cut-off level of NPV is lower in that case. From Equations 13 and 14,
Z B
Z
∞
k 2 − k1 = 0 1 Xf ( x) dx + Z12 Bf ( x) dx + Z 2 Bf ( x) dx − L
Z1
∞

− Z12 ( X − Z1 ) f ( x)dx − Z2 Jf ( x)dx.
Z

(15)

The above equation can be rewritten as
B
∞
Z
(16)
Xf (x)dx + Z12 (2B + I − L − X ) f (x)dx + Z2 (B − J ) f (x)dx − L.
Z1
It is difficult to get sharp predictions on the investment policy of the firm
from Equation 16. We restrict our analysis to the special case in which X is
distributed uniformly over an interval [0,M ] , where M > Z 2 .130 We further
k2 − k1 = 0 1
Z

129
We also consider the case where the DIP financing is provided at a priority higher than the senior
pre-petition debt. The results remain qualitatively the same and are not reported.
130
Distributions with more support in respective tails have not been considered and are left for future
work.
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assume that M > 2I , this implies that the firm invests only in positive NPV
projects.

Let the total indebtedness of the firm be denoted by T = B + J . Thus,
the combination of senior and junior debt can be denoted by ( B, B − T ) .
The following proposition describes the effect of the mix of total debt T
on the investment incentives of the firm:
Proposition 5 (P:5) For any given level of total debt T , and for every
level of senior debt B , there exists a unique level of liquidation LT * (B) such

that:

1. If the liquidation value of the firm L > LT * ( B) , financing from
the junior pre-petition lender would lead to higher levels of investment
(k 2 − k1 < 0) ,
2. If the liquidation value of the firm L < LT * ( B) , financing from the
senior pre-petition lender would lead to higher levels of investment
(k 2 − k1 > 0) , where:

 I + B
 2I + T + B 
B 1 −
+ (T − B) 


2M 
 2M
.
L*T ( B) = 
B
T
B
−

 

1 − 2M  +  M 


 

(17)

CONCLUSION
The Code provides unusual incentives to potential lenders to provide credit
to firms reorganizing under chapter 11. These include higher priority and
enhanced security for the loans commonly referred to as DIP financing.131
Furthermore, either the existing lenders, or a new lender, can provide the DIP
financing.132 A major requirement for DIP loans is the approval from the
bankruptcy court.133 This article focuses on the implications of allowing
different priority levels of DIP loans, as well as the effect of allowing prepetition versus new DIP lender to provide DIP loans.

131
See John D. Ayer et al., Obtaining Dip Financing and Using Cash Collateral, 23 AM. BANKR. INST.
J. 16 (2004).
132
See id.
133
See id.
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Our main result is that a higher level of priority for DIP loans would
provide incentives to invest a larger amount. This outcome would be desirable
for firms with attractive investment opportunities but with large debt overhang.
Thus, for firms faced with an ‘‘under-investment’’ problem, a bankruptcy
judge should allow a high priority level for the DIP financing. The increased
investment may not be optimal for firms that do not have many good
investment opportunities. In this case, the high priority DIP financing can lead
to dissipative investment in high risk, negative NPV projects.
A bankruptcy judge should keep this risk-shifting incentive in mind when
approving DIP financing and should scrutinize the higher priority DIP
financing proposals more closely. Cross-collaterlization is shown to be an
extreme form of high priority DIP financing and, as such, should be allowed
only when there is a reasonable degree of certainty that the firm possesses
good investment opportunities. In choosing between an existing or new lender
to provide DIP financing, the bankruptcy judge would need to ascertain the
desirability of higher investments because, for any given level of priority, DIP
loans from existing lenders are likely to induce more investments. Thus, for
firms faced with the ‘‘under-investment’’ problem, DIP loans from existing
lenders would be optimal. For firms that are prone to risk-shifting, the higher
profitability requirement of a new DIP lender would provide better monitoring.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1:
Equations 4 and 8 describe the minimum acceptable NPV for equal priority
and higher priority DIP loans respectively. To prove Lemma 1, we need to
show VBE − VBH > 0. Let VBE − VBH = K .
Substituting the values from Equations 3 and 7, we get:
Z
∞
∞
Z B

K =   Xf ( X ) dX +  Bf ( X ) dX  −   [ X − ( I − L )] f ( X ) dX +  Bf ( X ) dX ;
Z
Z

0 Z
  I −L
Z B
Z
(1)
K =  Xf ( X ) dX −  [ X − ( I − L )] f ( X ) dX .
0 Z
I −L

Since B = Z − ( I − L) , substituting and rearranging the terms of Equation 1,
we get:
I −L
Z
Z
 (I − L) 
 (I − L) 
K =  1 −
 Xf ( X )dX +  1 −
 Xf ( X )dX −  [ X − (I − L)] f ( X )dX ;
I − L
I −L
0 
Z 
Z 
I −L
Z
X
 ( I − L) 
(2)
K =  1 −
 Xf ( X )dX +  ( I − L)(1 − ) f ( X )dX .
I −L
0 
Z 
Z

Since ( I − L) < Z and X < Z over the interval ( I − L, Z ) it follows that
K >0.
Proof of Proposition 1:

Follows immediately from Lemma 1, as higher priority always leads to
greater investment. This higher investment is only optimal provided the
borrower has enough good, positive NPV projects.
The result is intuitively appealing, as the higher priority on the DIP loan
should induce the lender to finance a larger set of investment projects. Simple
numerical examples illustrate the investment decisions made by the firm.
Case 1: Liquidation value is low but investment opportunities are good
( VBE > VBH > L )

Consider a firm with pre-petition debt of face value B equal to 100, held by
two lenders that equally share ( ϕ = 0.5). The firm has a liquidation value L
equal to 80. One of the existing pre-petition lenders provides the DIP
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financing. Further, let VBH = 90 and VBE = 110 .134 If the DIP loan is at the same
priority as the pre-petition loan, then the lowest level of NPV, for which a DIP
lender would be willing to lend, can be estimated using Equation 4:
(0.5)(110-80)=15.
In this case, the firm would forego all projects with expected NPV between
0 and 15. Though, if the same firm were to obtain its DIP financing at a higher
priority, then the cut-off level of NPV, above which the DIP lender would be
willing to finance, is (using Equation 8):
(0.5)(90-80)=5.
Thus, the firm with higher priority DIP financing invests more than the
firm with equal priority DIP financing. For a firm that has investment projects
that are mostly positive NPV, higher priority of DIP financing is more likely to
induce value increasing investments.
Case 2: Liquidation value as well as investment opportunities are
mediocre ( VBE > L > VBH )

Again, using the example described above, let us consider a firm for which
V = 70 , L = 60 , and VBH = 50 . If the firm receives a DIP loan with equal
level priority to its pre-petition loans, it undertakes all projects with a NPV
equal to:
(0.5)(70-60)=5.
E
B

While the cut off NPV project for a firm with a higher priority DIP loan is:
(0.5)(50-60)=-5.
The higher priority DIP financing results in the firm investing in negative
NPV projects. In this case, equal priority of DIP loans results in better
investment incentives.
Case 3: Liquidation value is high and investment opportunities are
poor ( L > VBE > VBH )

Again, using the example described above, let us consider a firm for which
L = 50 , VBE = 40 , and VBH = 30 . If the firm receives a DIP loan with equal

134

The value of V BH and VBE would also depend on distribution f (X ) of cash flows as well as the
liquidation value L .
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level priority to its pre-petition loans, it undertakes all projects with NPV equal
to:
(0.5)(40-50)=-5.
While the cut off NPV project for a firm with a higher priority DIP loan is:
(0.5)(30-50)=-10.
Here the optimal decision is to liquidate the firm. If, on the other hand, DIP
financing were to happen, equal priority would cause less value destruction.
Proof of Proposition 2:

Proposition 2 implies that cross-collaterlization would lead to even higher
investment than a higher priority of DIP loan, i.e., minimum level of NPV
required by a lender with a cross-collaterlized DIP loan is even lower than the
cut-off NPV required by high-priority DIP lender. Thus, we need to show that
VBH − VBC > 0. Since ϕB + ( I − L) = Z -(1- ϕ ) B = T . From Equations 7 and 11:
∞
Z
VBH − VBC =   [ X − ( I − L )] f ( X ) dX +  Bf ( X ) dX 
Z
 I −L

Z [ X − ( I + ϕ B − L )]

∞
f ( X ) dX ;
−   Bf ( X ) dX + 
T
(1 − ϕ )

Z
Z
Z
[ X − ( I + ϕB − L )]
H
C
VB − VB =  [ X − ( I − L )] f ( X ) dX − 
f ( X ) dX .
ϕB + I − L
I −L
(1 − ϕ )

(3)

Let X − ( I − L) = S . Rearranging the right-hand side of Equation 3, we get:
[ X − ( I + ϕB − L )]
f ( X ) dX
I −L
ϕB + I − L
ϕB + I − L ϕ
(1 − ϕ )
ϕB + I − L
Z
Z
[ X − ( I + ϕB − L )]
=  Sf ( X ) dX +  Sf ( X ) dX − 
f ( X ) dX
ϕB + I − L
ϕB + I − L
I −L
(1 − ϕ )
ϕB + I − L
Z
1
=  Sf ( X ) dX +
 [(1 − ϕ ) S − S + ϕB ] f ( X ) dX
I −L
(1 − ϕ ) ϕB + I − L
ϕB + I − L

Z

VBH − VBC =  Sf ( X ) dX +  Sf ( X ) dX −

ϕB + I − L

ϕ

Z

I −L

(1 − ϕ )

ϕB + I − L

ϕB + I − L

ϕ

Z

=  Sf ( X ) dX +
=  Sf ( X ) dX +
I −L

Z



 [ B + ( I − L ) − X ] f ( X ) dX

 [ Z − X ] f ( X ) dX
(1 − ϕ ) ϕB + I − L

(4)
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Since Z is always greater than X for ϕB + ( I − L) < X < Z , and S > 0 for
( I − L) < X < ϕB + ( I − L) , the right-hand side of Equation A-4 is always
positive. Thus, VBH − VBC > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3:

We need to show that the minimum acceptable NPV, for a project to be
acceptable to a new DIP lender, is higher than the one required by an existing
lender. We derive this for the case when both the old and the new lender
provide DIP loans at equal priority, and then, we derive the same result for
higher priority DIP loans.
Case 1: The new lender provides financing at the same priority as the
pre-petition lender

We first consider the case in which the DIP financing is provided by a new
lender and at the same priority as the old loans. The incentive compatibility
constraint for a new DIP lender is:
∞
I−L
Xf ( X ) dX +  ( X − B ) f ( X ) dX − ( I − L ) > 0
0
Z
Z
Z B
∞
X − I >  Xf ( X ) dX +  ( B ) f ( X ) dX − L
0 Z
Z

Z



X − I > VBE − L

(5)

VBE is as defined before in Equation 3.
Equation A-5 allows us to compare the investment policy of the firm,
which obtained DIP financing from an existing lender, to the investment policy
of the firm that obtained DIP from a new lender. The cut-off level of NPV for a
project is (1- ϕ ) [VBE − L] for the firm with the DIP loan from its pre-petition
lender (Equation 4). The lowest level of NPV project that is financed by a new
DIP lender is [VB − L ] (Equation A-5). Since 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1 , the proof follows
immediately.
E

Case 2: The new lender provides financing at the higher priority than
the pre-petition loans.

In this case, a new lender provides the DIP financing, and the DIP
financing carries higher priority than the old loans.
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The new lender would finance provided that:
I −L

Z

∞

 Xf ( X ) dX +  ( I − L ) f ( X ) dX +  ( X − B ) f ( X ) dX − ( I − L ) > 0
I −L

0

Z
∞

Z

X − I >  [ X − ( I − L )] f ( X ) dX +  Bf ( X ) dX − L ;
I −L

X − I > V − L.
VBH is as defined in Equation 7.
H
B

Z

(6)

Equation A-6 allows us to compare the investment policy of the firm,
which obtained higher priority DIP financing from an existing lender, to the
investment policy of the firm that obtained higher priority DIP financing from
a new lender. The cut-off level NPV for a project is (1- ϕ ) [VBH − L] for the
firm with the DIP loan from its pre-petition lender (Equation 8). The lowest
level of NPV project, financed by a new DIP lender, is [VBH − L] (Equation 7).
Since 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1 , the proof follows immediately. The discussion of two cases
shows that if the priority level of DIP loan by existing lender or new lender is
assumed to be the same, the DIP financing by its existing pre-petition lender
leads to a higher level of investment. In other words, the minimum acceptable
NPV of a project is higher for a new DIP lender than the cut-off required by a
DIP lender who already has loans outstanding. The intuition behind this is the
fact that the new DIP lender receives the pay-off only from his DIP loan, while
a pre-petition lender can achieve some additional pay-off if the value of the old
loan increases. Again, for borrowers who face severe debt-overhang, but have
good investment opportunities, allowing an existing lender to provide DIP
financing would address the under-investment problem more effectively. If the
borrower does not have many good investment projects though, the higher
threshold required by a new DIP lender results in better investments.
Proof of Proposition 4:

Equation 4 provides the cut-off level of NPV required by an old lender
willing to lend at equal priority, while Equation A-6 describes the same for a
new DIP lender willing to lend at higher priority. The investment level would
be higher for DIP loans from old lenders only if:
(1 − ϕ )[VBE − L] < [VBH − L];

ϕ>

VBE − VBH
.
VBE − L

(7)
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Again, the desirability of higher investment depends on the set of
investment opportunities that the borrower has. If the firm needs to be provided
with higher investment incentives, an equal priority DIP loan from an existing
lender would achieve this outcome as long as the existing lender has a
sufficiently large outstanding loan.
Proof of Proposition 5:

The intuition behind Proposition 5 is that if the firm has high liquidation
value the senior creditors would suffer relatively smaller losses in case of
liquidation and thus would only finance projects with relatively higher NPV.
On the other hand, the junior debt-holders have little to gain from the
liquidation and would finance a larger set of projects. However, if the firm has
a very low liquidation value then the senior lenders would have incentives to
lend as the investment would offer some probability of recovering their
outstanding debt.
By assumption X :

Unif [0,M ] hence f ( x) = 1/M .

Substituting in Equation 16 we get:
Z B X
M
Z
k2 − k1 = 0 1
dx + Z2 (B − J ) f ( x)dx + Z12 (2B + I − L − X ) f ( x)dx − L
Z1 M
Let us define the following:
BZ1
Z B X
,
dx =
T1 = 0 1
2M
Z1 M
T2 = Z 2 ( B − J ) f ( x ) dx =
M

T3 = Z12
Z

(B − J )
[ M − Z 2 ],
M

(2 B + I − L − X )
(2 B + I − L)
( Z ) 2 − ( Z1 ) 2
dx =
[ Z 2 − Z1 ] − 2
.
M
M
2M

(8)

(9)
(10)

(11)

The Equation 8 can be rewritten as:
k 2 − k1 = T1 + T2 + T3 − L 
Z 

 Z + Z2

k 2 − k1 = B1 − 1  + J  1
− 1 − L.
2
M
2
M





(12)

If k 2 − k1 < 0 , we know that the firm will invest in a larger set of projects if
the DIP financing is provided by the junior creditor. If k 2 − k1 = 0 , the
investment decisions are unaffected by the choice of DIP lender. If k 2 − k1 > 0 ,
the investment is higher if DIP financing is from the senior creditor.
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Since J = T − B substitution for J yields:
Z 

 Z + Z2 
k 2 − k1 = B1 − 1  + (T − B )  1
− 1 − L.

 2M 
 2M

(13)

For k 2 − k1 = 0 , we get the critical liquidation value:

 I + B
 2I + T + B 
B 1 −
+ (T − B) 


2M 
 2M
.
L*T ( B) = 
B  T − B 

1 − 2M  +  M 

 


(14)

Further, k 2 − k1 is a decreasing function of L as shown below in Equation
15. Note that the right-hand side of Equation 15 is always negative under the
assumption that M > Z 2 .
∂ ( k 2 − k1 ) ( B − 2 J )
=
− 1.
2M
∂L

(15)

It follows thus if L is below the critical liquidation value ( k 2 − k1 > 0 )
then the DIP financing by the senior creditor leads to greater investment. On
the other hand, if L is above the critical liquidation value( k 2 − k1 < 0 ) then the
DIP financing by the junior creditor leads to higher investment.
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Table 1
The Hierarchy of Financing Options for a Firm Operating Under Chapter 11
Relevant
Section of the
Bankruptcy
Code
§ 363(c)(2)
§ 364(a)
§ 364(b)

§ 364(c)
Various
subsections
discussed
below
§ 364(c)(1)

Features of the
Financing
Arrangement
Use of Cash
Collateral
Debt incurred in
the ordinary course
of business
Debt incurred for
purposes other
than ordinary
course of business
Super-priority
Debt

§ 364(c)(2)
§ 364(c)(3)

§ 364(d)

Primed Debt

§ 522(b)

Crosscollateralization

Security and Priority of
the Post-petition debt
Not Applicable
Unsecured, Administrative
Priority
Unsecured, Administrative
Priority

Unsecured, Senior
Administrative Priority
Lien on unencumbered
assets, Senior
Administrative Priority
Junior lien on
unencumbered assets,
Senior Administrative
Priority
Secured by a senior or
equal lien on assets
already subject to lien or
pledge

Collateral securing the
pre-petition as well as
post-petition debt

Legal
Requirements
Approval of the
bankruptcy court
No court approval
required
Approval of the
bankruptcy court,
Notice and
Hearing
Debtor has to show
that it could not get
financing under
Sections 364(a) or
364(b)

Same as Section
34(c) and show
that existing
holders of the
security are
adequately
protected
Court Approval
(rarely given)
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Table 2
Priorities of Major Creditor Classes for a Chapter 11 Firm
Priority Rank

Claim and Relevant Priority Section
The primed lien DIP loans under § 364 (d).
Secured claim holders (up to the value of collateral) under
§ 506 (a).
Super-priority claims of the DIP lender under § 364 (c).
Administrative claims under § 507 (a) (1), § 503 (b), § 364
(a) and § 364 (b).
Involuntary gap creditor claims under § 507 (a) (2) and
§ 502 (f).
Unsecured claims (including the shortfall of collateral for
secured claims) § 506 (a).

